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Abstract 
An assumed gap between relief and development assistance was widely discussed in the 1990s. 
Urged to "mind the gap", the multilateral aid agencies adjusted. In terms of the initial learning phase 
– i.e. readiness to recognize a new set of problems and adjust objectives and programs accordingly - 
the agencies thus responded effectively. Functional adjustment was fostered by agency concern for 
their organizational standing, reinforced by inter-agency competition. Attempts by two agencies to 
forge a structured approach and create a regime to address "the gap" was neither successful, nor did 
it in the end prove necessary. The case suggests that inter-agency competition rather than 
cooperative regime-building is the easiest way to foster certain kinds of organizational learning. 
1. Introduction 
Discussion in the international aid community about a presumed gap between relief and 
development peaked in the late 1990s. The nature of the gap had been examined and, for the most 
part, found to exist, and there was a growing sense that adjustments in aid strategies were necessary 
to close it. On the intergovernmental level, the World Bank and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) initiated a structured discussion in the so-called Brookings process. Some 
national aid agencies established special offices and budget lines to address transitional needs (e.g. 
the Office of Transitional Initiatives in the US Agency for International Development and the 
special "gap appropriation" initiated more recently by the Norwegian Minister of Development 
Cooperation). NGOs and multilateral aid agencies working in either the humanitarian or the 
development sector were adjusting their programs to move into the gap. An assessment in 2000 
concluded that pursuit of both relief and development had become the dominant paradigm among 
international aid agencies working in enduring emergencies.1 Gap-closing efforts also appeared in 
other situations where the boundary between relief, reconstruction and development was porous, 
notably in so-called post-conflict situations.2 
 
This article examines the response to the gap problematique, with a focus on the multilateral aid 
agencies in the UN system. In a time of mounting concern about learning lessons in post-conflict 
situations, the identification of the gap problem and subsequent response appears as a case of 
functional adjustment in the international aid system to a new challenge. "Functional adjustment' 
here does not imply that the final outcome of the gap-addressing policies necessarily were positive, 
but, more modestly, refers to process. Whatever the eventual impact, identifying a problem and 
exploring ways of addressing it is a prerequisite for developing rational policies. In terms of policy 
process, this is a functional adjustment and a key element of organizational 'learning' as the concept 
is often used in the literature.3 How, then, do we explain that this kind of adjustment or learning 
                                                 
1 Philip White and Lionel Cliffe, “Marching Response to Context in Complex Political Emergencies: ‘Relief’, 
‘Development’, ‘Peaceb-building’ or Something In-between?” Disasters, vol 24, no. 4. 
2 The term “post-conflict” implies that there is a clean break between war and peace, and that societies that 
emerge from war do not experience continued conflict, including armed struggle. This is clearly not the case. 
The widespread use of "past-conflict" partly reflects the practice of the World Bank, which favored the usage 
for legal reasons. Its Articles of Agreement (especially Art.1(i))do not foresee lending operations to a member 
at war. The terminology has operational implications, see note 8.  
3 The usage is found in a broad range of studies - of enterprises (Chris Argyris, On Organizational Learning . 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), of international organizations (Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) and of states (Jack S. Levy, “Learning and foreign policy: 
sweeping a conceptual minefield,” International Organization, 48, 2 (Spring 1994). 
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seems to have occurred with respect to the gap between relief and development? What was the 
dynamic of change? Does the response appear as a concerted effort to solve a common problem - a 
regime building strategy, so to speak, that aims to establish norms, mechanisms and division of 
labor?4 Or is the analogy of Adam Smith's market more appropriate? In this perspective, the actors 
move autonomously to achieve their interests, in the process being steered by an "invisible hand' to 
meet a common good. There was also a question of which interests to pursue. For the multilateral 
agencies, the gap problematique generated familiar dilemmas arising from a potential conflict 
between a desire to expand, and a concern to protect the organizationa l essence. What form did this 
conflict take and how did it affect agency response? Finally, what was the nature of the gap in the 
first place, and to what extent does that explain the adjustment? 
2. The nature of the gap 
As usually envisaged, the gap between relief and development assistance occurs when a 
humanitarian operation is about to be completed, and aid projects for reconstruction and 
development are about to start. The gap is seen as having institutional and financial dimensions that 
arise from unclear organizational mandates for the transition period, the slow process of getting 
reconstruction/ development projects off the ground, inflexibility in donor budgetary lines, lack of 
coordination among actors, and traditionally weak links among humanitarian and development 
agencies.  
 
Three views of the gap towards the end of the 1990s indicate the nature of the debate and the 
perceived gap. 
 
The heads of the World Bank and UNHCR - who both were active in calling attention to the gap 
and the need for new responses - focused on the problems of relief-to-development transitions in so-
called post-conflict societies. In a joint statement issued to the Brookings-led discussion initiated at 
their behest, they identified two kinds of gaps.5 Claiming that many unmet needs of post-conflict 
societies and failed transitions attest to the inadequacy of the prevailing rehabilitation and 
reconstruction approaches, they identified a "gap in approach" between humanitarian and 
development agencies. To close it required establishing operational linkages between the two types 
of agencies early in the transition process. Second, they identified a "level of interest gap", which 
reflected the variable political interests of donor countries that produced inadequate and 
unpredictable funding for societies emerging from war.  
 
The analysis of an applied research organization closely associated with the Brookings process 
likewise claimed that many essential needs were unattended or addressed too late in the phase when 
humanitarian aid starts tapering off while longer-term reconstruction aid remains at the planning 
stage.6 Several specific gaps were identified. For instance, refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) return home without longer-term support for effective reintegration into the economic and 
social life of their communities. Human rights monitoring, police presence and other law and order 
                                                 
4 These were identified as key dimensions in early regime theory, see e.g. Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime 
Theory and International Relations. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, and remain central in recent work as 
well, e.g. in P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (eds.), Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned. 
Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. 
5 Sadako Ogata and James D. Wolfensohn, From war to peace: Improving the odds of success for war-torn 
societies. Some personal observations. Presentation at the Brookings Roundtable on the Relief to 
Development Gap, 15 January 1999. 
6 Shepard Forman and Dirk Salomons, Meeting essential needs in societies emerging from conflict. New 
York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 1999.  
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measures required to build public confidence in the early post-war phase are less likely to be funded 
in the transition period, and may suffer from greater delays in aid disbursement than tangible needs 
such as rebuilding infrastructure. Food distribution (or food-for-work type schemes) typically 
continues even after the immediate emergency is over, taking precedence over early measures to 
create long-term food security such as registration of land titles and rehabilitation of agricultural 
production. Local NGOs that are financed through budget lines for humanitarian aid may suddenly 
find their projects terminated as donors shift to public sector authorities that are favored by 
development agencies but typically have a slower pace of operations than private relief agencies. 
 
A high-level UN body representing all the multilateral aid agencies in the UN system - the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (ISAC) – identified several problems in immediate post-conflict 
situations that involve 'gaps' of one type or another.7 According to ISAC, there were institutional 
gaps reflecting the inability of agencies to cooperate effectively due to their semi-autonomous status 
and operations, which in turn reflected different mandates and institutional cultures. This gap 
appeared particularly in the relationship between humanitarian and development agencies. Political 
gaps occurred when main donors wanted to disengage from a area once the war and the 
humanitarian emergencies were over, rather than staying for the longer-term reconstruction process. 
An authority  vacuum was characteristic of post-conflict situations where local authorities typically 
were fragmented, weak or had little institutional capacity, while the aid agencies were unable or 
unwilling to take on the responsibilities of government. Synchrony gap was the term given by ISAC 
to problems of communication and understanding between international agencies and the host 
government. Finally, the committee identified a sustainability gap which reflected the limited 
capacity of the host government to sustain the momentum of recovery, particularly by covering the 
recurrent costs of services established by the aid agencies. 
 
Similar problems, as well as gaps arising from conceptual confusion, have been cited in much of the 
case study literature on aid programs or post-war transitions.8 In general terms, and as they appeared 
during the second half of the 1990s, the gaps can be grouped into 3 main types, relating to 
institutions, funding and substantive issues.  
 
The institutional gap reflects not merely mechanical problems of coordination between 
humanitarian and development institutions, but, more fundamentally, their different priorities, 
cultures and mandates. Most humanitarian activities are micro-oriented, providing communities or 
vulnerable groups with basic relief items such as food, shelter and basic health services for survival, 
mostly organized on a small-scale and having a short timeframe. With a traditional of focus on 
immediate life-saving services, humanitarians have not emphasized local involvement, 
sustainability and institution building, especially beyond the community level. While under pressure 
to change, the organizational culture of humanitarian agencies remains oriented towards speedy 
delivery of externally based service packages, delivered in a top-down mode 9As a result, 
humanitarian organizations that assist in, for instance, return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs 
                                                 
7 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Bridging the gap. New York, September 1999. 
8 An early landmark study was Krishna Kumar (ed.), Rebuilding Societies after Civil War, Boulder/ London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997, for series, see especially the cases studies published by the Humanitarianism and War 
Project at Brown University, and the ODI series published by the Humanitarian Practices network. As noted 
above (note 2), the term "post-conflict" is misleading. The operational consequences may be inadequate 
attention to conflicts that persist in the immediate post-war period. Humanitarian actors often argue that this 
justify continued humanitarian aid, while other aid actors and often the host government wish to move rapidly 
towards development aid. Joanna Macrae, “Aiding peace…and war: UNHCR, returnee reintegration, and the 
relief-development debater,” New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper no. 14, Geneva: UNHCR, 
1999.  
9 Monica Kathina Juma and Astri Suhrke (eds.), Eroding Local Capacity. International Humanitarian Action 
in Africa. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002.  
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have limited capacity to assist in reintegration and development for the longer term. The same 
applies to UNHCR, which, as we shall see below, has struggled to define its role and appropriate 
partnerships with development actors. The main UN development agency, UNDP, on the other 
hand, is more macro-oriented in that it works closely with government authorities. The same applies 
to aid agencies of national donors. Their policy guidelines typically emphasize comprehensive 
project and programme planning, longer-term sustainability and institution building. To the extent 
that they adopt a national perspective to assist all communities rather than specific war-affected or 
vulnerable groups, they are not always ready to continue funding programs or projects that were 
started in the relief phase. The history of post-conflict or post-emergency situations is littered with 
schools, clinics and bridges that were built in the relief phase, only to fall into disrepair due to 
failure to secure project funding in the development phase.10 To address such problems on a 
strategic policy level, a 'gap-perspective' would call for integration of relief-related activities such as 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees with national reconstruction plans.11 In practice, however, 
divergent institutional priorities and mandates make this difficult.  
 
 The macro funding gap: Slow implementation of development aid frequently create delays in 
financing and cause frustration in transition periods. But beyond disbursement issues of this kind is 
a more fundamental question. Funding for humanitarian and for development assistance typically 
originates from different budget lines in donor countries. Each has a distinct rationale. Humanitarian 
assistance is justified by saving lives in crisis and, at least in principle, is politically neutral and is 
allocated on the basis of need. Development aid, on the other hand, is legitimated with reference to 
a range of donor interests as well as recipient needs. It follows that countries which have received 
substantial humanitarian assistance will not necessarily receive comparable amounts for its 
transition and reconstruction needs. It is indicative that transitional programmes within the 
consolidated appeals process administered by the UN Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) are typically more underfunded than the pure relief appeals.12 For instance, appeals 
for the Caucasus region for 1999, which were primarily for consolidation and rehabilitation, were 
severely underfunded. Whether such disjunction indeed constitutes a 'gap' that should be closed 
through some form of institutionalized response has been at the heart of the gap discussion.  
 
New issues gap: New issues emerged in post-war countries that were not traditionally part of either 
the emergency or the development portfolio. Designed in the early 1990s as measures to implement 
peace settlements (e.g. in Mozambique), by the end of the decade something resembling a 
standardized package for post-conflict situations had come into being - complete with a specialized 
terminology. The package typically included programs for demilitarisation, demobilisation and 
reintegration of soldiers (widely known as DDR), "security sector reform" broadly defined, 
governance issues, human rights, transitional justice, law and order reforms, and establishment of 
democratic structures and processes. Together with reforms in other areas that might have 
contributed to the initial conflict, e.g. land ownership patterns, such activities had by the second half 
of the 1990s been subsumed under the concept of “peacebuilding”. Identifying the appropriate tools 
for "peacebuilding" became a widely shared objective in the international aid community, and 
spawned a growing social science literature as well.13 The progressive standardization of such tasks 
                                                 
10 "Conflict-affected countries:Reintegration assistance, development aid and the peacebuilding process." 
Geneva: UNHCR, 1999.  
11 Sarah Petrin, "Refugee return and state reconstruction: A comparative analysis” New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Working Paper no 66. Geneva: UNHCR, 2002. 
12 Toby Porter, An external review of the CAP. New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs. 2002. 
13 The range in approach and level of analysis is suggested by a few titles: Elizabeth Cousens and C. Kumar, 
Peacebuilding as Politics. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2001; Michael W. Doyle and N. Sambanis, 
“International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 
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was in itself recognition that post-war transition periods entailed special problems and needs. To 
that extent, the development of “peacebuilding” as a distinct area of concern was part of a 
functional adjustment by aid agencies to the evolving situation. Yet operational gaps remained 
whenever new issues of this kind fell outside conventional interpretations of agency mandates and 
programmes, or when donors were reluctant to fund such activities for reasons of risk or other 
reasons.  
 
By referring to a 'gap', advocates of special aid activities for transitional phases - whether from 
relief to development or from war to peace - invoked the normative power of language. In a policy 
context, the term has a negative connotation. A "gap' practically calls out to be eliminated; to argue 
that something constitutes a gap therefore implies a recommendation to close it by appropriate 
funding, institutional measures, or other forms of response. Particular aid actors may, of course, 
acknowledge that a particular gap exists, e.g. with respect to program support for reintegration of 
IDPs, yet decide not to participate in closing it. Yet acknowledging the existence of a gap implies 
that someone ought to address it. In a constructionist sense, therefore, the determination of whether 
or not the disconnects described above are 'gaps' must ultimately be a matter of policy judgement. 
An aid actor might conclude that no particular programs are necessary to reintegrate IDPs, or that 
there is no rationale for maintaining infrastructure built under the relief program in country Y. If so, 
there are no 'gaps'. If it is argued, on the contrary, that such transitional programmes are necessary, 
‘gaps’ will appear if there is no implementation. As we shall see, the multilateral agencies were 
actively involved in identifying gaps and calling for them to be addressed, although some were 
more active than others.  
3. The reactions and actions by the multilateral agencies 
Among the multilateral agencies, UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), OCHA and the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) are considered the core humanitarian agencies, while the World Bank 
and the regional development banks (such as IADB,AfDB and ADB), the Un Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the specialised agencies (especially the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) are the main development agencies. WFP and UNICEF are distinct because 
they are mandated to cover both emergency and development activities.14 With some variation, they 
all responded to "gaps" issues during the 1990s. We shall here look briefly at some of the UN 
specialized agencies: UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF and WFP, as well as OCHA, in the UN Secretariat, 
and the World Bank. 
 
UNHCR was a principal actor in placing the gap problematique on the international aid agenda. 
Already in the 1970s, the agency had been confronted by challenges of linking relief with 
development issues in Africa, but then in the context of soliciting donor assistance to settle refugees 
in countries of first asylum. In the 1990s, it was the apparent rash of peace settlements in the early 
part of the decade, set off by the collapse of superpower rivalry connected with the Cold War, 
which placed an unprecedented number of large-scale repatriation cases on its table. At the same 
time, UNHCR found itself confronting new types of challenges in the Balkan wars, where 
conventional asylum in other countries was not readily available to those needing protection, and 
                                                                                                                                                     
94 (4): (December 2000); Steven J. Stedman et. al(eds.), Ending Civil Wars, London/Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2002. A Review of Peace Operations. A Case for Change. Report from King’s College, London, 2003.  
14 WFP considers itself to be primarily a development agency promoting food security, but during the 1990s it 
has channelled some 70 per cent of its  resources for humanitarian purposes. For UNICEF, the major portion 
of its resources is for regular development programmes, and it is therefore the smallest actor in the 
humanitarian field. 
CMI WORKING PAPER FILLING “THE GAP” WP 2005: 14 
 6 
where the agency took on an expanded assistance role for all categories of war-affected populations. 
The new challenges coincided with the appointment of a new High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, 
who was prepared to respond with daring and innovation. The result was conceptual rethinking and 
organizational leadership, as an agency analyst correctly noted.15  
 
On a project level, the agency pioneered the "quick impact projects" (QIP) which supplemented the 
traditional repatriation assistance package and short-term food distribution with infrastructure 
projects to facilitate reintegration. On a policy level, the High Commissioner called for a 
comprehensive approach to refugee policy, which included consideration of the whole cycle of 
flight-related measures from pre-emptive steps to avert crisis, to post-crisis reintegration and 
peacebuilding. 16 Closing the gap between relief and development was part of this broader strategy; 
so was the agency's subsequent orientation towards protection-related issues in post-conflict 
situations. The aim was to reduce the likelihood that returning refugees would once again flee the 
country and end up as wards of UNHCR.  
 
From an organizational perspective, addressing gaps in aid coverage was thus a problem-driven 
strategy intended to address refugee problems effectively. In humanitarian terms, this was goal was 
a good in itself. From an agency perspective, success would increase its organizational standing in 
the eyes of the donors. Being acutely dependent upon ad hoc contributions from states for core as 
well as emergency funding, the agency was extremely sensitive on this point. A sense of being 
chronically underfunded reinforced the concern to demonstrate effectiveness. Organizational 
expansionism played a part as well. The 1990s has rightly been called a decade marked by “the 
humanitarian impulse”, and the new High Commissioner used a historic opportunity to give the 
agency a bolder and more aggressive profile.17 Working from a large, new headquarters building, 
with unprecedented budget and staff expansion, the leadership generated speculation during the 
preparations for the 1997 UN reform that UNHCR sought a status as the lead UN humanitarian 
agency. A larger and increasingly standardized agency role in reintegration, development and 
protection-related areas – often under an overall UN peacebuilding agenda - were part of this trend. 
 
An important part of the agency's strategy was to present the gap problem as a regime issue. 
Frustrated by the experience of working with UNDP on transitional relief-to-development issues, 
the agency sought a partner with a reputation for greater effectiveness and turned to the World 
Bank. The Bank, as we shall see below, had by this time started to address post-conflict issues as 
well. With two equally bold leaders, who happened to get along very well on a personal level, the 
two agencies moved to address gap issues more systematically. In the consequent Brookings-
process they called for particular procedures to identify and address gap issues and, importantly, 
fresh funds and new funding mechanisms.  
 
Not unexpectedly, the expansionary strategy pursued by UNHCR caused internal divisions and 
considerable soul-searching about the proper balance between the agency's functions. Would 
expansion in semi-development and peacebuilding activities be at the expense of protection 
obligations? Legal protection has traditionally been viewed as constituting the essence of UNHCR’s 
role, the other main function being assistance. By the early 1990s critics were already concerned 
that assistance was expanding much faster than the protection sector. Activities further afield from 
                                                 
15 Jeff Crisp, Mind the Gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, Geneva: 
UNHCR Working Paper, 2001. 
16 "UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future Refugee Assistance,," Special Issue of International Migration 
Rerview, vol 35, no 1 (2001). State of the World's Refugees, 1995. The Search for Solutions, Ge neva: 
UNHCR, 1995.  
17 Thomas G. Weiss, “The Humanitarian Impulse,” in the United Nations Security Council since the Cold  
War, ed. by David Malone, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming.  
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immediately relief might infringe upon the agency's organizational essence and present it with tasks 
for which it had no comparative advantage. 18 Despite such concerns, the agency's non-protection 
activities continued to expand during the tenure of High Commissioner Ogata in the 1990s. The 
development was reflected in budgetary and staffing terms, as well as the broader range of services 
that the agency provided to refugees, IDPs and returnees. 
 
The World Bank has moved rapidly and with considerable determination to address a series of 
'gap' issues.19 The bank promoted the term "post-conflict" in the aid community and helped 
elaborate operational implication. It established a small Post-conflict unit in1997, and authorized a 
modest 'post-conflict fund' on the assumption that the immediate post-war period required flexible 
means of funding as well as justifying special lending criteria for lending. Earlier in the 1990s, the 
bank had taken the lead in coordinating international aid for reconstruction after the Oslo Accords 
on Palestine and the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia -Herzegovina (although in Bosnia the EU 
subsequently took the lead). Throughout the decade, the bank participated in rehabilitation and 
reconstruction programs in virtually all post-conflict situations. In some countries it has assumed a 
predominant role among foreign aid actors (e.g. Afghanistan). In many cases it has expanded into 
non-traditional bank sectors such as security sector reform, democratization and reconciliation with 
programs designed to link reconstruction with much broader political aims. The bank has for 
instance launched programs for "community-driven development" and "community empowerment” 
designed to promote economic reconstruction as well as local-level empowerment and 
reconciliation. Building on older bank programs, such initiatives are being institutionalized (with 
appropria tely coded designations such as CDD and CEP) – and adjusted to fit post-conflict 
situations. To mark the change from reconstruction narrowly understood to a comprehensive 
approach, the Post-Conflict Unit in Bank changed its name in 2002 to the Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Unit. 
 
Why did the bank move into a new area of this kind with such apparent speed and ease? As in the 
case of UNHCR, there were historical precedents. In the mid-1980s, the bank had worked with 
UNHCR to support the temporary integration of Afghan refugees in Pakistan through development-
oriented projects. While not identified at the time as a "gap" filling program, it bridged conventional 
humanitarian assistance and standard development projects, and was hailed as an innovation in 
institutional cooperation in this area. There was also a logical connection with the organization’s 
core mandate. To make the leap from reconstruction of Europe after World War II- which had been 
a key element of the bank’s original function - to reconstruction of war-devastated areas wherever 
they occurred half a century later required little institutional imagination. Proponents of expansion 
argued that the bank had to adjust as part of its core mandates evolved and - importantly - moved to 
the top of the international policy agenda. Like Ogata in UNHCR, the bank's new president - James 
Wolfensohn, appointed in 1995 - took an expansive view of the Bank's role. In this connection he 
expressly supported post-conflict activities. He also agreed to co-chair UNHCR’s initiative to 
institutionalize a collective response to gap issues through the Brookings process. When that 
process stalled, Wolfensohn continued to support an active bank role in post-conflict issues, as 
demonstrated, for instance, in the small but high-visibility case of East Timor. 
 
                                                 
18 Crisp op.cit., Macrae, op.cit. 
19 For in-house assessments of the Bank's role, see Steven Holzman, Rethinking “relief” and “development” 
in transition from conflict. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 
1999; Post-conflict reconstruction. The role of the World Bank . Washington DC 
World Bank, The World Bank’s experience with post-conflict reconstruction. Washington DC, May 1998. For 
an external analysis, see SusanL. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Succvessful peace Implementation," in 
Stedman, op.cit. 
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Wolfensohn could draw on a precedent of a different kind as well. The bank has a long history of 
expansion into new issues-areas. As an ex-official recently noted, this has partly taken the form of 
lateral issue expansion into sectors that previously were treated as social inputs into the 
development process (human resources and social sector development).20 Greater involvement in 
these input-areas in order to influence more elements of the development process could be seen as a 
form of organizational learning. Other issues the bank took on at least in part to co-opt critics 
(gender and the environment). As in the case of UNHCR, expansion has not been without 
considerable internal friction and complaints to the effect that the Bank's agenda has grown so 
complex it has become unwieldy. 21 
 
Other agencies in the UN system have been less visible in regime-development efforts, but have 
adjusted to the gap in other ways. 
 
In the UN Secretariat, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has 
a mandate to develop a more integrated UN-wide response to complex crises and peacebuilding. 
Prior to the 1997 UN reforms, however, the office (then called Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs) actually contributed to a sharp distinction between relief and development. The office-
administered consolidated appeals (CAP) did not allow projects that were part of a more transitional 
and developmental phase, such as education. Only after the 1997 reforms were appeals for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects included in the CAP.  
 
An explicit function of OCHA is to bridge the ‘institutional disconnect’ in complex emergencies 
and transitional situations. Where an OCHA-supported UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator is appointed 
alongside the UNDG-appointed UN Resident Co-ordinator, supported by UNDP, the office 
emphasizes the need to maximise linkage in transitional situations. Beyond this, there has been an 
ongoing debate within OCHA on how much the office should engage itself in post-war transitions. 
The office has not been very active in defining or promoting new issues as a gap problem. On the 
funding side, the official view has been that humanitarian relief, development programmes and 
transition projects have to be undertaken simultaneously in many complex emergencies 
humanitarian aid, and may be difficult to distinguish. Yet many OCHA staff have argued that CAP 
should retain a focus on explicitly humanitarian activities. Given limited funding, the humanitarian 
agencies should give priority to ongoing emergencies and limit their involvement in the relief-to-
development process, it has been argued. A corollary of this view is that development agencies, 
particularly the World Bank, should contribute more actively to early recovery and reconstruction. 22 
 
UNDPs approach to gap issues was initially constrained by the view that its organizational essence - 
as expressed in its mandate - was to support development activities in member states. In the early 
1990s, the agency became involved in post-conflict situations in an ad hoc manner on a country-by-
country basis, e.g. in Haiti, Central America, Mozambique and Angola. Generally, however, the 
leadership questioned whether transitional activities formed part of its mandate and was reluctant to 
support, let alone push, for an expanded role. An internal evaluation later called it an “uneasy 
beginning” in “unfamiliar terrain”.23 It was only in 1995 that a new Emergency Response Division 
(ERD) became operational, and in 1996 UNDP started to allocate a special budget line for support 
to “countries in special circumstances”, including post-war transitions. While the amount available 
                                                 
20 Jessica Einhorn, "The World Bank's Mission Creep," Foreign Affairs, September-October 2001. 
21 Einhorn, op.cit. 
22 Chr. Michelsen Institute, Evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance through the UN and international 
organisations 1992-98. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Danida. (Evaluation report 1999/9, Vol. 8). 
23 Sharing new ground in post-conflict situations. The role of UNDP in support of reintegration programmes. 
New York: United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation Office, 2000. 
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from UNDP’s core budget has been limited, the agency has attracted additional donor funding for 
its new role.  
 
After a slow start, the pace has picked up. With a new leadership in 1999 and a reorganized Bureau 
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the UNDP sought more aggressively to insert itself in post-
conflict reconstruction situations. In Afghanistan, for instance, the new head of UNDP, Mark 
Malloch Brown, obtained a special mandate from the UN Secretary-General to be “UN Coordinator 
for Recovery”, and the agency positioned itself to play a major role in transitional activities in the 
country in security (DDR), governance (including human rights) and local-level reintegration and 
rehabilitation (building on the previous P.E.A.C.E program).  
 
Elsewhere UNDP has been supporting restructuring of government institutions, elections and 
election monitoring, reintegration of demobilised soldiers, mine action programmes, and other 
rehabilitation and reconciliation programmes. The Programme has recently expanded its security 
sector role, e.g. by adding in 2003 a new “justice and security sector reform (JSSR)"program. 
UNDP has been actively involved in the organisation of post-conflict Round Table donor meetings, 
establishing special trust funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and assisting countries in 
organising and coordinating donor support for such activities. Through the UN resident coordinator 
system, UNDP is the lead agency for the UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF), with 
the task of integrating post-conflict, rehabilitation and similar “transition gap” issues into the overall 
planning of UN activities in a country. 
 
As agencies with a mandate for both emergency and development tasks, UNICEF and WFP should 
in theory experience few constraints issuing from their organizational essence when addressing 
issues that straddle conventional relief-development distinctions. 
 
An independent report for UNICEF nevertheless claimed that UNICEF only reluctantly became 
involved in emergencies.24 The report argued that a reluctant commitment and engagement in 
situations of chronic emergencies had had a negative impact not only upon the quality of the relief 
interventions, but also upon the agency's capacity to conceptualise and operationalize longer term 
responses to chronic instability. As a result, UNICEF was seen to risk being squeezed out from its 
aid niche in situations of chronic instability as other relief and development agencies extended their 
interventions into transitional and rehabilitation programming. 
 
The point was evidently taken. Since mid-1998 the agency has made some effort to change course. 
It sought to project a consistent policy position that linked UNICEF contributions before, during, 
and after an emergency. The underlying assumption was articulated: the distinction of emergency 
versus development strategies had "become outdated in the context of global instability, economic 
crisis, a proliferation of civil strife and conflict, and sudden, unpredictable natural disasters”.25 It 
was further argued that that UNICEF’s long-standing development experience and the framework 
of the country programme provide a basis for transitional strategies to blend a range of shorter and 
longer-term interventions into a coherent programmatic response. The claim is supported by the 
agency’s integrated funding structure - UNICEF appeals separately for emergency supplementary 
funding, but integrates all of its activities within one country program. The agency has increasingly 
incorporated post-conflict activities and other transitional issues into its regular programme. These 
include support for traumatised children, demobilisation and integration of child soldiers, 
reconstruction of day-care centres, schools, local hospitals and health posts, rehabilitation of water 
supply, and mine awareness raising.  
                                                 
24 Joanna Macrae and Mark. Bradbury, Aid in the twilight zone: A critical analysis of humanitarian- 
development aid linkages in situations of chronic instability. London: ODI, A report for UNICEF, 1998. 
25 An overview of UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate and activities. New York: UNICEF, 1999. 
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WFP has traditionally distinguished between emergency and development operations, both 
operationally and in financial terms. For instance, WFP programs that provided food for refugees or 
IDPs were long treated organizationally as “protracted emergency operations” even if they lasted 
for years. While food supplies for development projects generally take the form of “food-for-work” 
or require another counterpart contribution from the recipient, emergency food supplies are 
normally distributed free of charge. In protracted emergencies, however, free deliveries are often 
combined with counterpart schemes, including food-for-seed planting. 
 
WFP's development projects were until the mid-1990s not designed to cater for post-conflict 
reconstruction needs, although there were some notable exceptions (e.g. Cambodia). In 1997-98, 
however, WFP produced a new policy paper, “From Crisis to Recovery” which was approved by 
the Executive Board in May 1998. The paper reviewed WFP’s assistance to crisis-affected 
populations and identified lessons for better linking relief to development. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, WFP claimed they were moving towards a better “blending” of emergency 
and development operations.26 The agency cited lessons learned: recovery is haphazard, uneven and 
complex; a proper strategy for integrating developmental approaches in relief and recovery is 
needed; situation-specific responses work best; standards (for durability, etc) may have to be 
adjusted in a recovery stage; and funding arrangements should facilitate recovery. As a 
consequence, the agency's unit for protracted relief operations (PRO) was renamed to protracted 
relief and recovery operations (PRRO). New guidelines required that in a new emergency operation 
supported under the EMOP budget lines a recovery strategy must be formulated within 18 months, 
including early introduction of more forward-looking recovery approaches. 
 
Summarising the development during the 1990s, we see that in the early 1990s, the agencies 
involved in post-war transition activities were rather few. At the end of the decade, the area had 
become rather crowded. Traditional humanitarian and development aid agencies hade ‘moved in’, 
in addition, other UN offices and agencies had established themselves in post-war situations as well 
(e.g. UNDPA in elections, the new High Commissioner for Human Rights in justice areas had also 
established operational activities in post-war situations). Schematically, and allowing for type of 
gap areas the multilaterals had moved into, the new situation looked like this (with parenthesis 
indicating partial moves):  
 
 
Addressing the institutional 
disconnect 
Filling the macro funding gap Filling the new issues gap 
   
UNHCR   
OCHA OCHA  
(World Bank) World Bank World Bank 
UNDP (UNDP) UNDP 
   
WFP (WFP)  
UNICEF  (UNICEF) 
 
 
                                                 
26 CMI, op.cit. 
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4. Explaining adjustment 
The explanations for why the agencies by the end of the decade had all incorporated a 
problematique into their programs can be found on the contextual, institutional and idiosyncratic 
level. First, the context was clearly propitious for promoting new aid strategies that addressed 
transitional issues relating to relief, reconstruction and development. The international political 
developments in the 1990s favored a focus on humanitarian activities, and – as a number of 
conflicts were settled or permitted new political beginnings – on consolidation of peace processes. 
“Conflict prevention” became a new mainstream objective in OECD/DAC deliberations; 
“peacebuilding” and “post-conflict activities” dominated the aid discourse in the UN system. Huge 
sums of aid money were pledged to specific post-war situations, particularly in the many high-
visibility cases (e.g. 4-5 billion dollars over an equal number of years in Bosnia and Afghanistan). 
While this was hardly new money for the multilateral agencies in an absolute sense (as it likely 
would eat into other aid budgets of the donors), for particular agencies and particular programs it 
appeared as additional funding. Against this background, the agencies obviously had incentives to 
defined problem areas as “a gap” that must be closed in order to consolidate peace, prevent conflict, 
promote durable solutions to humanitarian problems, and increase the utility of aid by better linking 
relief to rehabilitation and longer-term development programs. Donor-promoted criteria of 
“coherence” and “effectiveness” in project evaluations specifically reinforced the power of a gap 
language.27 Closing “gaps” was by definition a step towards coherent and effective utilization of 
aid.  
 
The broader aid context thus favored a discourse and programmatic activity that addressed gaps 
between relief and development and between violence and rehabilitation in post-conflict situations. 
Given that all the aid agencies considered here had a humanitarian and/or development mandate, it 
is not surprising that they all responded by taking the gap problematique on board. Not to do so 
meant risk of being excluded from an emerging aid niche. The implicit rules of the competition for 
donor money meant that visibility was important in addition to effective and coherent programs. 
Since each agency was heavily dependent upon donor contributions for their core as well as 
program funding, - and in a general sense they competed for the same overall pool of money – they 
all had a general reason to take up the gap issues. 
 
Yet, as we have seen, the agencies responded differentially. Two moved out ahead of the rest, 
thereby having considerable responsibility for shaping the discourse and placing the gap issues 
firmly onto the international aid agenda. Institutional and idiosyncratic factors are here significant. 
Both were ‘heavy’ agencies in their respective areas – development lending and relief assistance. 
One (UNHCR), had a strong problem-driven motivation in the sense that its central task (reducing 
the number of the world’s refugees by promoting durable solutions) was dependent upon effective 
responses in several related areas (e.g. reintegration, rehabilitation of refugees). Just as the World 
Bank earlier in a form of lateral issue expansion had taken on a range of social determinants of 
“development”, increasingly the UNHCR increasingly involved itself in determinants of 
“refugeehood”. For both UNHCR and the Bank, moving into areas they defined as “gaps” between 
relief and development could be seen as being logically connected to their core mandate. This 
facilitated an expansionary policy and helped stem internal criticism that it multitasking would 
dilute the organizational essence and detract from competing obligations. Alongside these 
intuitional explanations were important idiosyncratic factors: both organizations happened to have 
new, strong leaders that were open to innovation.  
                                                 
27 The criteria are elaborated in publications by the evaluation network ALNAP, administered by the Overseas 
Development Institute, London. www.alnap.org  
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By comparison, the other agencies appeared as latecomers and less aggressive. The differential 
response might well be explained by idiosyncratic factor. It is indicative that a leadership change in 
UNDP reinforced the agency’s subsequent determined move into the gap area. 
5. Conclusions 
The strategy followed by the World Bank and UNHCR in the second half of the 1990s was 
essentially a regime-building approach. Given the powerful sponsorship, it is remarkable that the 
Brookings process barely got off the ground. A main reason was that donors resisted regime 
development of a kind that they feared would obligate new funds and introduce an additional 
bureaucratic layer in the international aid system. Donors instead preferred to retain control of 
funding and urged the agencies to address gap issues through improved coordination. 
 
With the regime-building strategy aborted, a competitive market process essentially prevailed. The 
agencies adjusted by responding individually, although within an elaborate set of rules and 
consultations prevailing in the UN aid system. In this sense, the functional adjustment, or learning, 
was a product of a competitive process and did not require a more structured regime. It should be 
recalled, however, that this conclusion does not necessarily apply to the policy outcome, which has 
not been addressed in this article. It is quite possible, for instance, that a competitive market process 
is sufficient for actors in a multilateral aid system to identify new problems and integrate them in 
their programs. Addressing the problems effectively may well require a more structured approach of 
a regime kind, as regime proponents indeed argue. 
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SUMMARY
An assumed gap between relief and development assistance was widely discussed 
in the 1990s. Urged to “mind the gap”, the multilateral aid agencies adjusted. 
In terms of the initial learning phase - i.e. readiness to recognize a new set of 
problems and adjust objectives and programs accordingly - the agencies thus 
responded effectively.  Functional adjustment was fostered by agency concern for 
their organizational standing, reinforced by inter-agency competition. Attempts 
by two agencies to forge a structured approach and create a regime to address 
“the gap” was neither successful, nor did it in the end prove necessary. The case 
suggests that inter-agency competition rather than cooperative regime-building 
is the easiest way to foster certain kinds of organizational learning.
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